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Abstract  
This study investigates the short and long term performance of firms listed 
on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) on the ex-rights day of seasoned equity 
offerings for the period from 1999 to 2006. We use the event study methodology 
to analyze the common stock price reaction around ex-rights days. Moreover, we 
assess the long-term performance of firms having a seasoned equity offering using 
leverage and investment ratios. The overall findings are in line with several past 
studies which attest positive and statistically significant abnormal returns on the 
ex-right day. The long term performance of those firms having a SEO seems to be 
affected following a SEO.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1. Introduction 
In contrast to an initial public offering (IPO) wherein a firm issues equity to 
the public for the first time, a seasoned equity offering (SEO) arises when a firm 
is already publicly traded and is merely putting on the market additional shares. 
Recent empirical studies in corporate finance attest that the issuance of SEOs is 
frequently correlated with firms‟ stock price adjustments. This thesis documents 
the common stock price reaction to the issue of SEO for companies traded in the 
Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) during the period from 1999 to 2006 by analyzing 
stock returns on the ex-rights day. The study also examines the performance of a 
number of ratios, for which there are supporting indications of substantial 
influence following a SEO.  
As indicated in the extant empirical literature, the raise of capital by equity 
subscription is to a certain extent a controversial topic, with no blatant and single 
answer. The variation in methodology of equity issue, the inconsistency in the 
type of data that are used (daily and rarely monthly), the difference in countries 
selected for investigation and the institutional framework of each country, are the 
rationale for the divergence in results relating to SEOs.  
The majority of the past studies investigate the wealth effects surrounding 
the announcement date of SEOs. Indicatively, we allude to Kim and Lee (1990), 
Molin (1996), Ecbo and Masulis (1992), Kang and Stulz (1996) and Tsangarakis 
(1996) who provide testimonial evidence of an increase in returns after the SEO. 
Contrary to the researches cited above, several studies report a negative market 
reaction to the issue of new equity, such as White and Lusting (1980), Masulis 
and Korwar (1986), Asquirh and Mullins (1986), Armitage (1999), Slovin (2000) 
and Hansen (1988). However, there is a growing literatureresults displayed in 
previous studies. A case in point is Nelson (1965) and Loderer and Zimmerman 
(1988) advocate that a share capital increase does not have an effect on stock 
prices and stock returns. 
There is a limited number of studies that have assessed the short-term 
market reaction to SEOs in the ex-rights date. However, if we look cautiously at 
the empirical work that has been done on stock performance at the ex-rights date 
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of SEO, no incidents do thoroughly illustrate an abnormal reaction in the same 
vein, fact that makes our research interesting. The documented negative abnormal 
reaction in the short-run for SEOs and the significant number of firms that exhibit 
a positive performance exemplify this discrepancy. What comes out of this 
considerable empirical literature on the equity issues is that, as maintained by 
Tsangarakis (1993) on the ex-rights day, there are no abnormal returns concluding 
that the Greek stock market is efficient in the semi-strong form. In contrast, Goyal 
et al. (1994) finds significant abnormal stock returns that are related to significant 
increases in trading activity on the ex-date. Sitting on the fence of the above 
results, McGuiness (2001) report that in a fair market, the ex-adjustment in rights 
offering should ensure that trading strategies around this date yield zero returns on 
average. 
The purpose of our study is to delve into the market response to the raise of 
equity in cash both in short-run and long-run around ex-rights date. The 
ramifications of seasoned equity offerings on old stock or ex-rights stock raises 
major interest, particularly in the view of the scant attention the subject has 
received so far. Our sample consists of 310 SEOs from firms listed on the ASE 
with an ex-right date during the period from 1999 to 2006. The full sample is 
further analyzed to financial and non financial firms. To assess the short-term 
market reaction to ex-rights days we employ the classical event study 
methodology as shown by Brown and Warner (1980).  
One issue that has been particularly neglected and we aim to examine is the 
performance of SEOs in the long run using financial ratios. As a prior step to 
answering this question, however, it would seem proper to investigate the 
relationship between ratios of different fiscal years around the subscription of 
SEO. For this research, we choose ratios from different categories. Using different 
time intervals we assess the ratios‟ efficacy from one fiscal year to another, with 
the appliance of mean and median tests.  
It should be noted that under the Greek corporate law, there are two ways of 
raising capital, the nominal increase and the actual increase in share capital. The 
core difference of the two methods is that nominal increase requires part of the 
equity to be converted into share capital with no cash contribution, whereas the 
actual increase requires the sale of new shares to the current or new shareholders, 
to be realized with real cash contribution. We believe that this idiosyncrasy of the 
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Greek capital market makes our study interesting and we believe that the results 
obtained contribute to the pertinent literature.  
Following on this introduction, the remainder of this document is structured 
as follows: In the next section, we refer expansively to prior studies. In section 
three we describe deeply the issuing methods that are employed to raise equity in 
Greece and the Greek institutional context. Section four describes the SEO sample 
and the data, while the fifth section elucidates the methodology that has been 
applied. The results from both the short and long-run behavior on ex-rights are 
reported and analyzed in section sixth. As a final point, some concluding 
comments are presented in section seven. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Studies in the USA 
Several empirical studies have been conducted worldwide testing the stock 
price behavior following a seasoned equity offering (SEO). The majority of them 
were conducted in United States and fewer in Europe or Asia. The results of these 
studies are varied since the factors-criteria that are taken into consideration are not 
the same in all markets. These factors are associated with the methods of raising 
capital through a SEO, and thus create different market conditions or even 
different samples and different legal environments.  
Starting with the US studies we go back to 1965 when Nelson (1965) was 
the the first who examine the US seasoned equity offerings on the ex-rights date 
for the period 1946-1957. He found that the stock prices six months after rights 
offerings are not significantly different than those six months prior to the equity 
issuance. Seven years later, Scholes (1972) following Nelson, investigated US 
rights issues for the period 1926-1966. More specifically Scholes looked into the 
price pressure hypothesis based on the assumption that the demand curve of a 
company‟s share does not present full elasticity, but appears to have a downward 
slope. The results of his work were that stock prices raise the period before the 
SEO, fall by a percentage of 0.3% during the month of the issue and remain 
unchangeable after that.  
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Smith (1977) by utilizing the market model and monthly returns for period 
1926-1975 concluded that there are no significant excess returns during the month 
of the rights offer. White and Lusztig (1980) examined the reaction of the stock 
price around the date of the announcement using daily returns for the period 1962-
1972. They found, in agreement with the previous ones, that there is a negative 
and statistically significant effect on stock prices. Asquith and Mullins (1986) 
investigated the impact on stock prices of seasoned equity offerings that were 
subscribed with a public offering. They employed a sample of 226 industrial firms 
and 265 utility firms that were listed in the NYSE. The examined period covered 
the years from 1963 to 1981. The share price response, associated with the 
issuance of new equity, was reported as negative since the reduction of stock 
prices was significant. Regarding to industrial firms, a statistically significant 
decrease of 2.7% of the average abnormal returns was observed at the day of the 
announcement. The decline for utility firms undulated at a lower level of 0.9%, 
statistically significant as well. Moreover, registered secondary distributions of 
industrial stock were followed by a drop in firm value equal to 78% of the 
proceeds of the sales. The findings of their study are in accordance with the 
hypothesis that seasoned equity offerings do not comprise good news for investors 
and that the demand curve of a company‟s stock has a negative slope.  
At the same year, Masulis and Korwar (1986) dealt with the variation of the 
price of common stocks, applying an event study methodology for the years from 
1963 to 1980. All the announcement dates were published in the Wall Street 
Journal Index. As results from their investigation, they came up with a statistically 
significant decline in stock prices when seasoned equity offerings were 
announced. In both studies of Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Masulis and 
Korwar (1986), what is in common constitutes the fact that the reduction in the 
price after the SEO is bigger in industrial companies compared to utility ones. 
Furthermore, they show that the stock offerings both in the primary and secondary 
market, as well as stock and bond offerings, experience a negative change at the 
price of the share. Last but not least, both studies advocate that the information 
asymmetry is larger in industrial firms than in utility firms due to regulation. 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) conducted their analysis on the stock price 
effects of security offerings based on the information that the announcement of a 
seasoned equity offering transmits to the investors. As a time horizon they took 
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ten years, from 1972 to 1982 using daily returns and including industrial firms in 
their sample. The results showed a decrease in stock prices after the 
announcement. Hansen (1988) examined the equity issuance with rights for the 
period 1964-1986, finding an excess return of -1.21% on the announcement date. 
Wruck (1989) for the years from 1979 to 1985, observed a statistically 
insignificant excess return of 1.89%. Kothare (1991), investigating US rights 
offerings for the period 1970-1987, documented negative and statistically 
significant announcement period abnormal returns.  
Dating back to the 90‟s, Eckbo and Masulis (1992) conducted their research 
in the period 1963-1981 and examined the relation between seasoned equity 
offerings with rights and changes in stock prices. They divided SEOs into three 
subcategories depending on the method that the equity issuance was executed. 
First, they introduced uninsured rights, then SEOs with standby underwriting and 
finally SEOs with firm-commitment underwriting. With their investigation they 
perceived a positive and statistically significant effect on the average stock returns 
in the cases where there was no underwriter, while in the cases with an 
underwriter, negative and statistically significant returns were detected. One year 
after, in 1993 Hertzel and Smith, referring to the period 1980-1987, found a 
cumulative abnormal return of 1.72% for the days -3 to 0.  
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) studied the long-run stock performance 
following a seasoned equity offering. Investigating the years 1975-1989, they 
found that the companies of an industry that conducted a SEO, underperformed 
compared to firms of the same industry and size that did not conduct a SEO. 
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995 p. 266) pointed out that “long term 
underperformance by equity issuing firms is consistent with a mis-measurement 
of the relative risk of the sample and matching firms.” Nevertheless they checked 
that the underperformance of the issuing firms might be a result of the trading 
system, firm book-to-market ratio, firm size, and firm age and not due to weak 
risk managers.  
Loughran and Ritter (1995) used the calendar-time portfolio approach to 
measure long-run abnormal performance and found that the variation in returns 
between issuing and non-issuing firms over a five year period after the issuance is 
44%. Trying to explain the low returns that appear after the seasoned equity 
offerings, Loughran and Ritter (1995) pointed that “… it is possible that some as 
12 
 
yet unidentified risk factor or factors can explain some or all of the low returns.” 
The results were in accordance with the hypothesis that when a stock of a 
company is overvalued, it is the time that the firm announces SEOs and remains 
overvalued after the announcement.  
Loughran and Ritter (1997) came up with similar results when they 
examined the seasoned equity offerings announced for the period 1979-1989. 
They reported that the operating performance of firms after the SEOs is poor. The 
post-issue profitability of these companies reached high levels but declined after 
the equity issuance. Concluding their study Loughran and Ritter (1997) claimed 
that poor operating performance can be predicted since firms are about to 
announce seasoned equity offerings. Additionally, they pointed out that 
underperformance fluctuates at different levels depending on time; when equity 
issues are limited underperformance is negligible, while at periods with high 
issuing activity underperformance is harsh.  
Brav, et al. (2000) using a sample of 3,775 seasoned equity offerings from 
1975 to 1992, assessed abnormal performance by comparing buy-and-hold returns 
of the event firm relative to a benchmark. As a benchmark they used size, book-
to-market and momentum portfolios. They found that the five-year average 
annualized BHARs (buy-and-hold abnormal returns) are -3.9% for the equal 
weighted portfolio and -3.4% for the value weighted portfolio. Using the same 
method and employing a sample of 3,315 SEOs from 1964 to 1995, Eckbo, et al. 
(2000) found that BHAR is -4.8% for the equal weighted portfolio and -2.2% for 
the value weighted portfolio.  
 Jegadeesh (2000) came up with an annualized BHAR of -4.9% for the 
period 1970-1993 taking as a sample 2,992 U.S firms. Finally, Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) examined 4,439 seasoned equity offerings from 1961 to 1993 and 
got an annualized BHAR of -2.7% for the equal weighted portfolio and -1.1% for 
the value weighted one. 
 
2.2.  Studies in the UK 
Compared to the USA, there are fewer studies that examine short-run and 
long-run performance following a seasoned equity offering in the UK. Marsh 
(1979) was the first who studies rights issues in the UK market. In his paper, he 
took into consideration all SEOs that had been conducted during 1962-1975. His 
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work involved tests of market efficiency concerning the announcement of the 
equity issuance. Moreover, Marsh (1979) tested the price pressure hypothesis 
against the substitution hypothesis, that‟s why he estimated the demand curve for 
the company‟s shares. The results displayed huge positive abnormal returns 
before the announcement date and a setback during the months around the equity 
issuance.  
Levis (1995) dealt with the long-term abnormal performance examining 158 
companies that proceeded to seasoned equity offerings within five years of their 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) over the 1980-1988 period. The empirical findings of 
his research showed that the corporations having launched SEOs after the IPOs, 
have positive abnormal returns 12 months before the announcement and negative 
abnormal returns 18 months after the announcement. Five years later, Michailides 
(2000) using UK data from 1975 to 1996 found that, 15 months before the equity 
issue, firms have superior buy-and-hold returns against the FTA Share price Index 
return.  
Slovin, et al. (2000) conducted a survey about the wealth effects 
surrounding the announcement date of rights issues and private placements from 
1986 to 1994. More specifically, their sample consisted of 220 rights issues and 
76 placements. The insured rights issues experienced an average excess return of -
2.9% for the days -1 and 0 (where 0 suggests the announcement date), while the 
uninsured rights issues hd a two-day excess return of -4.96%. Finally, they found 
a positive excess return of +1.22% for private placements. Suzuki (2000) also 
investigated the effect on the stock price following SEOs from 1991 to 1996. 
Once more, negative abnormal performance was observed for rights issues, while 
positive abnormal performance was detected during open offer announcements.  
Abbay Abhyankar and Keng-Yu Ho (2001) study the long-horizon 
abnormal performance of rights issues and placings over the period 1989-1997. 
They find that firms making rights issues and placings have positive BHRs 3 
years prior to the event announcements and negative performance in the 3 years 
following both categories of seasoned equity offerings. 
Ho (2005) using UK data of 670 rights issues over the period 1989-1997 
tested the underperformance hypothesis. After his investigation he came up with 
significant negative BHARs over a three year post-issue period. Ngatuni, et al. 
(2007) analysed the long-run stock market performance after seasoned equity 
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offerings completed in the UK over the period 1986-1995. In addition, they used a 
smaller sample of open offers during 1991-1995. Five years after the equity 
issuance, the average return of firms that proceeded to rights issues was 41.8% 
lower than the average return on non-issuing firms using size and book-to-market 
matched control stocks. The smaller sample of open offers, experienced positive 
abnormal returns compared to the sample of issuing firms with rights. 
 
2.3. Studies in Australasia 
Looking at the Japanese market we meet Kunimura and Severn (1990) who 
investigated the issue of new stocks and how their prices are affected after the 
issue. Using the event study methodology and taking monthly returns, they 
observed abnormal returns of 1.4% during the first month of the issue and 
insignificant abnormal returns in the following months. 
Goyal, et al. (1994) examined the stock price and trading volume behaviour 
around the ex-rights date of rights offerings of firms listed on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange for the period from 1975 to 1989. They reported a significant abnormal 
stock return of 7.10% on the ex-date of the offering. Additionally, they came 
across with significant increases in trading activity on the ex-date. 
 Kang and Stulz (1996), who also investigated the Tokyo‟s stock market, 
found positive cumulative abnormal returns of 2.21% for rights issues and 0.51% 
for open offers during the period 1985-1991. Later, Cai and Loughran (1998) 
tested 1,389 seasoned equity offerings made in Tokyo stock exchange over 1971-
1992. They provided evidence of a negative performance of SEOs over a five year 
period after the SEO announcement. As benchmarks for measuring performance 
they used comparable industry returns, market portfolio, size and book-to-market 
control firms, size-matched firms and industry-matched firms. The results 
documented underperformance for the size and book-to-market control firms. 
Kang, et al. (1999) investigated the long-run performance of Japanese 
companies subsequent to 1,329 convertible debt, 727 direct equity issues to the 
public and 51 rights issues throughout the period 1980-1988. The main finding of 
their survey was that five years following the issue, direct offerings to the public 
underperform the size matched control stocks by a percentage of -47.37%. 
Empirical studies regarding the stock price reaction to seasoned equity 
offerings have been carried out in Korea as well. Kang (1990) investigated the 
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impact of rights issue announcement on shares prices. He examined 89 SEOs that 
occurred in the period 1984-1987. By analyzing daily returns and with the 
application of the event study methodology, he reported a significant stock price 
increase throughout the period surrounding the announcement of the rights issue. 
At the same year, Kim and Lee (1990) analysed rights issues over the period 
1984-1988. Their sample comprised of 239 seasoned equity offerings. They 
calculated monthly returns and used the event study methodology. They noted that 
the announcement of rights issues brings a significant increase in share prices 
resulting in positive abnormal returns of 3.2%. 
In New Zealand, Marsden (2000) dealt with 88 rights issues over the period 
1976-1994. A significant decline in stock prices was observed; when an 
underwriter was involved, this reduction seemed more severe. 
Long-run underperformance subsequent to seasoned equity offerings was 
also found in other countries as well. In Australia, Brown, et al. (2006) found a 
negative abnormal performance following the announcement of 664 rights issues. 
 
2.4. Studies in Europe 
In Netherlands De Jong and Veld (1998) investigated open offers and rights 
issues from 1977 to 1996. Analysing the days from t=-1 to t=+1, they found 
evidence of  negative abnormal returns of -0.41% for open offers and negative 
abnormal returns of -1.46% for rights issues too. One year later, Koevoets (1999), 
carrying out a similar study, found statistically significant negative abnormal 
returns of -3.83% for rights issues and 0.63% for open offers. The examined 
period was from 1983 to 1998 and the event period from t=-1 to t=0. 
In Sweden, Molin (1996) tested for abnormal behavior around rights issue 
announcements for the period 1980-1994. He found a three-day cumulative 
abnormal return of 0.89%. In Finland, Hietala and Loyttyniemi (1991) found 
evidence of a statistically significant abnormal return of 4.15% for the days t=-1 
to t=+1 over the period 1975-1988. 
In Norway, Bohren et al. (1977) investigated once more rights issues during 
the period 1980-1993. Taking into consideration the uninsured underwriter issues 
and the insured ones, he found a statistically significant cumulative abnormal 
return of 1.55% and -0.23%, respectively. 
In Switzerland, Loderer and Zimmermann (1988) using monthly stock 
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returns for rights issues, reported a cumulative abnormal return of 2.6% over the 
period 1973-1983.  
In Germany, Stehle, et al. (2000) dealt with the post-issue performance of 
non-financial firms that proceeded to 584 rights issues from 1960 to 1992. They 
noted that the buy-and-hold abnormal returns are -3.17% for value weighted 
returns and -9.01% for equally weighted returns. 
In France, Jeanneret (2005) analyzed the long-run performance of seasoned 
equity offerings. For the period 1984-1998, only 44 direct offerings to the public 
were reported compared to 402 rights issues. It should be noted that until 1973 the 
French institutional framework didn‟t permit equity issues directly to the public 
without rights. The author found statistically significant negative buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns of -15.38% for the equally weighted returns and -11.31% for the 
value weighted returns, 36 months after the issue. 
In the Spanish market, Rubio (1986a-1987), using monthly data, detected 
negative abnormal returns in equity issues. In later studies, Arrondo et al. (2000) 
and Martin-Ugedo (2003) reported significantly negative short-term abnormal 
returns using daily data. One year later, Pastor-Llorca and Martı´n-Ugedo (2004) 
investigated the long-run effect on shareholders‟ wealth and firms‟ operating 
performance following seasoned equity offerings with rights. They found that 44 
rights issues over 1989-1996 period substantially underperform the different 
benchmarks employed. Furthermore, they pointed out a decrease in profitability of 
the firms after the equity issue. 
Last but not least, in Greece Tsangarakis (1996) analysed the stock price 
reaction to the announcement of rights issues for the period 1981-1990. His 
sample constituted of 59 SEOs by firms listed in the Athens Stock Exchange. 
Contrary to many studies, Tsangarakis reported positive and statistically 
significant abnormal returns on the announcement day of the issue. In addition, he 
performed a cross-sectional analysis in order to identify the factors that explain 
this abnormal performance. Therefore, he provided empirical support to the 
hypothesis that rights offerings on the ASE are perceived as good news about the 
firms; future investment opportunities.   
 
2.5.  Evidence on long-term performance 
Most of the previous empirical studies have documented negative abnormal 
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behavior surrounding the announcement date of seasoned equity offerings. The 
interpretation of this abnormal pattern has been the subject of considerable debate. 
One argument that is widely used to explain these results is the information 
asymmetry. That means that investors punish in some way the company, as they 
consider it to be overvalued. On the other hand, firms take advantage of this 
information asymmetry and issue new shares (when they are overvalued) with the 
intention of enriching existing shareholders. However, this phenomenon is 
eliminated since markets revalue the issue of new shares downwards (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984). 
 Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) put 
forward this argument, also called market timing hypothesis in order to explain 
the long-run abnormal performance following SEOs. Though, none of the two 
studies make any reference to investors‟ irrational behavior as an interpretation of 
underperformance. The investor sentiment model of Daniel, et al. (1998) is 
considered as a response to that call. They support that there are two 
psychological biases; overconfidence and biased self-attribution. As regards to the 
first one, it leads investors to believe that their private signals are superior to 
public news. Self-attribution causes investors to update in the precision of their 
private signals in an asymmetric fashion. Both of them predict short-run 
momentum in stocks returns and long-run reversals consistent with the timing 
hypothesis. A vital subject matter that occurs is whether market efficiency is 
disputed by the long-term underperformance following SEOs. If market efficiency 
is assumed, then revaluations of SEOs should be completed. However, if 
underperformance continues for a long time after the announcement of the issue, 
this fact reveals that stock markets under-react and shares remain overvalued 
subsequent to equity issues. 
Fama (1998), through his attempt to interpret the inconsistent findings of 
long-horizon event studies, refers to two main subjects concerning the 
methodology that is used. Concerning the first one, it is related with the models 
employed to estimate expected returns and the incompleteness they seem to have; 
the methods of measuring abnormal returns do not accurately control for risk. The 
second one, it addresses to important biases at the methodology applied in 
measuring and testing returns in large periods. (Barber and Lyon, 1997, Kothari 
and Warner, 1997 and Lyon et al. 1999). Nevertheless, Fama (1998) concludes 
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that anomalous performance in the long-run is not robust and can be disappeared 
if suitable corrections for risk are made.  
Eckbo et al. (2000 p. 251) found evidence that appeared to support Fama‟s 
(1998) critique, and concluded that, “… the „new issue puzzle‟ is explained by a 
failure of the matching firm technique to provide a proper control for risk.” They 
took a zero investment portfolio and concluded that the hypothesis of zero 
abnormal returns could not be rejected; this outcome made them doubt on the 
long-run underperformance of earlier studies. On the other hand, Jegadeesh 
(2000) after the completion of his survey states that abnormal performance is 
robust. The result is in stark contrast with Eckbo et al. (2000) findings, but 
Jegadeesh (2000) attributes this to the fact that Eckbo et al. (2000) included IPOs 
to their benchmarks. 
What comes out of the literature on the long-run performance is that there is 
no proper, widely accepted way to give suitable results. The problem is mainly 
restricted to the misspecification of the alternative hypothesis of no abnormal 
returns. However, this should not imply market inefficiency. Moreover, Fama 
(1998) supports that long-run underperformance is not attributed to market 
inefficiency but to what he calls “chance”. Each company daily faces a number of 
events, making over-reaction of shares to be as possible as under-reaction. In 
reference to him, most of these problems can be dealt with the appropriate 
technical changes. 
 
2.6. Ex-rights 
Only few empirical studies have been conducted on the stock price reaction 
of rights issues around the ex-rights date. 
Back to 1965 Nelson (1965) was the first who examine the US seasoned 
equity offerings on the ex-rights date for the period 1946-1957. He found that the 
stock prices six months after rights offerings are not significantly different than 
those six months prior to the equity issuance. 
Tsangarakis (1993) also investigated the common stock price response on 
the ex-rights day of seasoned equity issues. Examining 34 seasoned equity 
offerings during the period 1981-1990, he documented that there are no abnormal 
returns on the ex-rights day. 
Goyal, et al. (1994) examined the stock price and trading volume behavior 
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around the ex-rights date of rights offerings of firms listed on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange for the period from 1975 to 1989. They reported a significant abnormal 
stock return of 7.10% on the ex-date of the offering. Additionally, they came 
across with significant increases in trading activity on the ex-date. 
Paul Mcguinness (2001) investigated 29 rights issues between January 1998 
and April 1999. The analysis generally confirms an efficient adjustment process 
and also shows that perturbations from the proportionate increase in the nominal 
share capital 
of the issuer, stemming from the rights issue. 
 Consuelo Riano, Francisco-Javier Ruiz and Rafael Santamarı´a (2005) 
examined the influence of the subscription rights market on the liquidity and the 
trading activity of ex-rights stocks during the subscription period. The results 
indicate that the liquidity of the ex-rights stocks, except on the two first trading 
days, increases during this period. Trading activity also increases, particularly in 
the first week and the last two weeks. 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
3. The Greek SEO Environment 
Share capital is one of the main ways to finance a public company (SA), and 
through this process, to enter new assets to the company and enhance its solvency. 
Capital is constantly being raised in the market, particularly if the company aims 
to extend its capitalization and to accommodate further growth, while for others 
this raise can be seen as a signal of distress, reflecting weak performance and 
diminishing liquidity and, hence the need to raise new funds. As share capital 
consists of the nominal value of a share multiplied by the amount of shares, it is 
obvious that an increase in capital can be executed in different ways, (i.e. with an 
increase in the amount of shares or in their nominal value). In Greece, we identify 
two ways of raising capital, the nominal (or accounting) increase in share capital 
and the actual increase.  
 
3.1.  Nominal Increase 
In nominal increase, part of the equity is converted into shared capital, with 
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no cash payment. Equity is composed of reserves, re-evaluation differences, 
undistributed profits, capital surplus, etc. Nominal increase occurs when a 
company converts part of the equity to the share capital without inducing any 
alteration in the total capital of the company. It involves just a book re-
arrangement resulting in nominal increase in company‟s liabilities (i.e. 
Accumulate profit / Reserve is debited and share capital is credited). The increase 
in equity is, therefore, carried out by issuing new shares only to the existing 
shareholders with free distribution or by increasing the nominal value of shares. 
The most ordinary methods to produce nominal capital increases are the 
capitalization of profits, the capitalization of reserves and the capitalization of 
fixed assets and are analyzed briefly above. 
 
3.1.1. Capitalization of profits  
The company‟s decision to distribute a number of shares to the 
shareholders, apart from cash dividend payments, results in the capitalization of 
profits. Capitalization of profits refers to a procedure in which the accumulated 
profits of a company are converted into capital; thus, the issue of bonus shares 
does not lead to any inflow of new funds, but is the case of a  mere reallocation of 
company‟s fund.  
Under the Greek corporate law, subject to the approval of Board of 
Directors, a company that announces bonus issue is obliged to realize the offer 
within a predetermined period of time and for a predetermined part of the profits. 
Moreover, the Board of Directors determines not only the number and type of 
shares issued at face value and the price of the disposal, but also the amount and 
manner of this increase. To capitalize profits, the following occur:   
• The company‟s cash resources may not be enough to pay dividend in 
cash; consequently a cash outflow is avoided. 
• The company‟s intention to evade from giving an impression of 
profiteering with bringing down the rate of dividend. 
• A stock price adjustment to a level that it is believed to pull on 
additional investors. 
• An enhancement of the number of shares which also creates a 
potentiality of attracting more shareholders. (law 2190/20) 
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3.1.2. Capitalization of reserves 
The increase of the share capital by means of capitalization of the 
company‟s reserves is carried out when reserves are paid out to the existing 
shareholders in the form of extra shares, without requiring additional payment on 
the part of existing shareholders. The reserves of a company are subtracted from 
the net profits mainly, which are not distributed to shareholders, and the 
subtraction is imposed by the statute of the aforementioned or by the law.  
The increase in equity is assumed to be merely nominal, as an accounting 
size, in the sense that reserves constitute an asset and are simply converted to 
share capital. Furthermore, the capitalization of reserves is accomplished either by 
issuing new shares or by increasing the nominal value of existing shares and it is 
resolved by the exceptional general Meeting of shareholders by amending the 
company‟s statutes. Some reasons for the capitalization of reserves are: 
• The share capital base increases and the company may attain an 
augmented balance sheet in the eyes of the investing company.  
• It bears the prospects of raising further funds. 
• It is an approach to improve liquidity. (law 2190/20) 
 
3.1.3. Capitalization of fixed assets 
Another way to increase nominally equity is through the re-evaluation of 
fixed assets. The re-evaluation of fixed assets occurs in order the true value of the 
assets that a business owns to be precisely depicted in its books.  It is compelled 
by Greek corporate law in cases that the fair market value of assets has change 
due to the time lapse, so assets which are recorded in accounts at the historical 
price have to be reassessed in order to reflect economic reality. The amount of the 
capitalization is distributed to shareholders by a free distribution of shares or by 
an increase in the nominal value of shares. (law 2190/20) 
 
3.2.   Actual Increase 
Regarding the second type of equity increase, the actual increase, new 
shares are issued and distributed to the current or new shareholders with the 
intention of fundraising. The cash obtained from the sale of new shares is added to 
the company‟s value and, thus, the share capital increases without requiring 
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simultaneous reduction in any other account as in the case of the nominal 
increase. 
The actual increase is achieved with two methods: 
• Public offerings 
• Rights issues/ offerings with rights 
 
3.2.1.  Public offers 
In public offerings the equity raise is carried out with cash inflow obtained 
from the sale of new shares to existing and new investors. The usual type of 
public offerings is the Initial Public Offerings (IPO) that take place when a 
company enters the stock market for first time. 
An indispensable feature of public offerings is the existence of an 
underwriter. Usually, an investment bank plays the role of the underwriter and is 
appointed by the company issuing the shares. The underwriter settles on the 
offering price of the issued securities and guarantees the sale of issuing shares to 
the public. A supplementary obligation of the underwriter is to protect the 
organization from a potential financial loss in the case that shares are not sold out.  
In general, the bank receives underwriting fees and can earn profits when selling 
the underwritten shares to investors. 
 The price at which the new shares are issued is determined with the help of 
book building process. The role of the underwriter is advisory and 
complementary. Throughout the period for which the book for the offer is open, 
the bids are obtained from investors at different prices and finally an issue price is 
determined on the basis of the demand of new shares. After the bid closure 
derived from the demand engendered by the process. (Abhyankar and Ho, 2001) 
 
3.2.2. Rights issues/ offerings with rights 
In a rights issue, the new shares are offered to the existing shareholders in 
order to subscribe additional shares in proportion to the shares they already hold. 
In essence, shareholders are given priority to buy the new shares and thus 
safeguarding their economic rights from a probable dilution of their wealth by 
seasoned equity issuance. The priority that shareholders are given is owing to the 
preemption right, meaning the right of first refusal on new shares and it is legal. 
Preemption rights give the prospect to existing shareholders to preserve their 
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proportion holding in the company.  
The rights are in general tradable securities and are used by organizations 
that are listed in stock exchanges. Subsequently, shareholders who do not want to 
acquire new shares put on the market the rights to someone who does. Each 
investor holding a right can decide to exercise the right by a definite date at a set 
price. In case that the rights are not sold, the company can trade them for the 
rights holder. 
Offerings with rights are the form of SEO that we examine. In such issues 
the current shareholders are given the right to procure extra shares, usually in an 
amount in proportion with their prevailing holdings. The price is predetermined 
and it is typical to offer the shares at a discount to their prevailing market price. 
This guarantee at some extent that for the duration of the approval period the 
prevailing price of the company's shares does not descend under the offer price of 
the rights issue. If this were to arise, shareholders would not engage in their rights. 
Nonetheless, a price at discount unavoidably lessens the company's share price 
towards the level of the price of the rights issue. Shareholders are permitted to buy 
a number of shares that corresponds to the number of shares they hold at a 
specific date, the ex-rights date. (Abhyankar and Ho, 2001) 
It is essential to state the fundamental role of the underwriter in a rights 
issue. The underwriter is typically a bank and has the responsibility of directing 
the procedure of the underwriting. Underwriting entails the systematic process of 
security registration for the financial sourcing of an offering through the purchase 
of securities for resale to the public. If securities are not sold, the underwriter has 
the commitment to buy them.  
The underwriter‟s fee for taking the risk is a profit from the difference 
between the buying and selling prices, consequently this is a motive to sell as 
many units of the issue as possible at the highest price possible. With the intention 
of minimizing the risk a broker is hired with the reward of commission. Broker‟s 
responsibility is to mediate between a buyer and a seller and on the occasion that 
acts as a seller or as a buyer becomes a party to the deal. (Investopedia, 2010) 
Offerings with rights are distinguished from private placements and open 
offers. Their characteristics are analysed below. 
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3.2.2.1.  Private Placements 
In a private placement, the new shares are offered to particular shareholders 
via private compromise or book-building, at a common offer price. The 
underwriter purchases the new shares and distributes them to exterior investors.  
Because of being offered to a small number of selected traders, the private 
placement does not have to be listed to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and is exempted from the typical reporting obligations. Private placements are 
regarded as a gainful way for small businesses to raise capital without going 
public through an initial public offering (IPO). (Abhyankar and Ho, 2001) 
 
3.2.2.2.  Open offers 
In an open offer, shareholders are entitled to purchase new shares in 
proportion to their existing holdings. In fact, open offers are like a research for 
current shareholders to acquire new shares. What discriminates open offers from 
rights issues is that open offers are not traded since there they are not completed 
with a negotiable document. The discount of the offer price should not exceed the 
10% of the average market price at the announcement date. (Abhyankar and Ho, 
2001) 
 
3.3. Regulation of the SEOs in Greece 
The regulation concerning the increase in share capital is different for the 
nominal increase and for the actual increase. 
 Starting with the nominal increase, the Greek corporate law 2190/1920 
modified by the law 3604/2007 specifies that the raise of capital is approved by 
the majority of the General Assembly. The law states that the new shares are 
distributed only to existing shareholders depending on the number of shares they 
already hold. The increase in share capital without cash payment, gives a 
preemptive right to the wholly new capital for the new issued shares in proportion 
with the current capital. Companies that carry some of these rights, are prohibited 
from entering into any form of advertise, publication or other document.  
Additionally, when the reserves of the company are less than 1/4 of the paid share 
capital, the raise is subjected to the approval of shareholders at the General 
Assembly. The decision taken by the company to increase the share capital must 
at least indicate the increase of capital by the way of its coverage, the number and 
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type of shares that are issued, the nominal value and issue price thereof and the 
period of coverage. 
The statutes may also extend the right of preference in cases of increase 
through contributions in cash or issuance of bonds convertible to shares. 
Regarding the actual increase, the Greek corporate law 2190/1920 modified 
by the law 3604/2007 stipulates that the actual increase can be decided by: 
• The General Assembly (GA) with a quorum of 2/3 of the paid share capital. 
This increase is a modification of the constitution and must follow the legal 
process to amend it. In the absence of a quorum of 2/3 of the paid share 
capital, two iterative GA follow with percentages of quorum of 1/2 and 1/3, 
respectively of the paid share capital. 
• The statutes also makes provision that during the first five years after the 
establishment of the company, the Board of Directors has the right to a 
decision, taken by a majority of two thirds (2 / 3) of the total number of 
shareholders to increase the share capital wholly or partly by issuing new 
shares for an amount not exceeding the initial capital. 
• The statutes may stipulate that during the first five years the company‟s 
establishment, the General Meeting decides to increase the share capital, 
wholly or partly by issuing new shares totaling up to five times the initial 
share capital. 
The actual increase is achieved: 
• With contributions, in cash or in stocks, with a price at par or above par 
with immediate or partial payment. The price of exercise should be equal 
or higher of the par value of stocks. 
• By conversion of bonds to shares. The investors holding them have the 
right to exchange of bonds with shares. When the bond is issued, for an 
amount that should not exceed the half of the outstanding share capital, the 
debenture holders have the right to swap the bonds in shares. The date and 
the way of the exercise of the right are designated in holder‟s decision. 
If the increase in share capital is not a distribution in stocks or issues of 
bonds convertible to shares, those who hold the bond are given the preemption 
right for the whole new capital, at the time of the issue of shares, depending on 
participation in the existing share capital.  
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The right should be exercised within a specified time limit, as it is stipulated 
by the corporate body which has decided to realize the increase. This period of 
time should not be less than fifteen (15) days. If the shares have not been 
withdrawn until the end of the deadline, set by the institution of the company and 
should not be less than a month, they are freely available from the company‟s 
board.        
At this point we should draw attention to some important changes that took 
place in last decades in Greek stock market which are directly linked to the 
institutional framework developed above. In 1990s the Greek stock market 
experienced a rapid growth and investor attention leaving behind the status of the 
„emerging‟ capital market. The upgrade of the ASE to a mature capital market 
was as a result of the country‟s financial development as well as the improvement 
of its legal and institutional environment. In 1999, the ASE general index and 
corporate stocks reached historical records. This dramatic increase in stock prices 
proved to a temporal phenomenon mainly attributable to speculation and price 
manipulations. These phenomena called for stricter regulation and elimination of 
fraudulent practices. The adoption of corporate practices such as corporate 
governance rules, MiFID etc. was the immediate answer for better regulation and 
for a stable institutional environment. This gradual progression of the ASE has 
resulted to be regarded a dependable stock market leading Greece to join the 
European Union. The entrance in EU engendered additional alterations to the 
Greek legislation, analogous to those of other European countries. So in 
nowadays, for firms listed in the ASE the equity issue through rights offering is 
the most usual method decided during a company‟s general meeting. (law 
2190/20) 
 
 CHAPTER 4 
 
4. Sample 
To examine ex-rights effects we collected 310 rights issues that were 
conducted by firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). The sample of 
firms pursuing a SEO contains both financial and non-financial firm and spans the 
period from 1999 to 2006. The ex-rights dates were extracted from the Profile 
database. Stock offerings by these firms had to meet the following criteria to be 
27 
 
included in the sample: 
1. The seasoned equity offerings took place between January 1999 and 
December 2006. 
2. The firm was listed on the Athens Stock Exchange at the time of the 
seasoned equity offering. Hence, there are no initial offerings. 
3. The seasoned equity offering was conducted with rights issues, in cash, 
concerning only common stocks.  
During our sample selection process we found companies having issued 
rights offerings more than once, within the same year. In such cases we opted for 
analysis the most recent equity issue.  
 During the period under examination, financial firms conducted 54 rights 
issues and non-financial firms carried out 256 rights issues. Financial firms 
include banks, insurance and investment companies. Non-financial firms comprise 
corporations from the following industries: holding companies, IT vendor, textile 
industry, wholesale, metal products companies, construction companies, cement 
companies, real estate companies, information technology solutions companies, 
furniture industry, farming, refineries, clothing companies, publishing-printing 
companies, rubber-plastic companies, car rental companies, shipping companies, 
electronic equipment companies, fish farming companies, cable companies, 
jewellery manufacturer companies, retailers, transport companies, machinery and 
equipment companies, hotels and other accommodations, wood and cork products, 
entertainment, telecommunications, food companies, distillery, pharmaceuticals, 
chemical companies and miscellaneous activity. 
To compute abnormal returns around ex-right dates we use daily adjusted 
closing stock prices derived from the ASE Dissemination Information 
Department. 
To examine the long-run performance of companies launched a SEO, we 
have recourse to a number of profitability, leverage and investment ratios. All 
these ratios were derived from Bloomberg and Thomson One, as a complementary 
database. At this point, we should stress that in the long-term analysis we faced an 
intricacy in obtaining all the ratio prices under investigation, since there was data 
unavailability in both databases. Therefore, this procedure trimmed the final 
sample significantly. 
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Table 1: Sample distribution by year 
 
Financial Firms Non Financial Firms Whole Samlpe 
Year N % N % N % 
1999 13 24% 72 28% 85 27% 
2000 6 11% 59 23% 65 21% 
2001 1 2% 9 4% 10 3% 
2002 4 7% 16 6% 20 6% 
2003 6 11% 21 8% 27 9% 
2004 8 15% 20 8% 28 9% 
2005 8 15% 25 10% 33 11% 
2006 8 15% 34 13% 42 14% 
TOTAL 54 100% 256 100% 310 100% 
 
 
Table 1 presents the sample distribution of SEOs for the whole sample and 
for the two sub-samples (i.e. financial and non-financial firms) separately. SEO 
issues seem to be concentrated particularly in the first two years of the examined 
period, that is 1999 and 2000 comprise 27% and 21% of SEO issues, respectively. 
We should note that 2001 and 2002 appear to have few SEO subscriptions, since 
then the ASE stocks experienced dramatic decreases which resulting in the 
suspension of new SEOs. 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
5. Methodology 
This chapter presents the methodology employed to investigate firm 
performance using stock returns and ratios after a seasoned equity offering. In the 
first part, we present the methodology used for the short term assessment, applied 
in stock prices around the ex-rights date. In the second part, we display the 
methodology for the long-run firm performance using various ratios. 
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5.1. Short term analysis: share price behavior   
 To accomplish the short term analysis, we apply the event study 
methodology as described and published by Brown and Warner (1980 and 1985). 
The event study methodology is designed to assess the impact of an event on a 
specific dependant variable and seeks to resolve whether there is an abnormal 
stock price result associated with an event. By doing this, we can deduce the 
significance of the event. The selection of the event study methodology relies on 
the fact that it is a widely used method for the reason that the event findings are 
very clear and easy to construe and share.  
More specifically, in our case, we designate as the event day the ex-rights 
day of the seasoned equity offering, which is the day 0. We divide the final 
sample into two sub- samples related to the firm activity. Therefore,, after the 
division, the two sub-samples that occur are the financial firms and the non 
financial firms. Our motivation comes from the relative high number of non-
financial firms that issue seasoned equity offerings in the Greek market. We also 
interested in analyzing the two sample of firms separately in order to detect 
differential market response around ex-rights days.   
Applying the event study methodology, for each security i on the event day 
we compute abnormal returns (or predicted errors) as is given by the following 
equation:  
eit = Rit – E(Rit)    (5.1) 
where Rit denotes the actual stock return and E(Rit) indicates the expected 
return for the security i on the event day t.  
 Starting the analysis, in order to estimate the expected return, a benchmark 
is required. This benchmark can be calculated with the utilization of 
 a) the market model,  
 b) the mean- adjusted model, and   
 c) the market- adjusted model. 
 
5.1.1. The market model 
The market model estimates the expected returns with the subsequent 
equation based upon the coefficients a and β: 
Rit = ai + βiRmt + eit       (5.2) 
where  
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i= 1, 2, 3…, N representing the stock i 
t= 1, 2, 3…, M representing the day t 
Rit = the return of stock i on day t   
Rmt = the market portfolio return on day t  
ai = E(Rit) - βiΕ(Rmt) 
βi= Cov (Rit, Rmt) 
eit= the abnormal return or predicted error of the stock i on day t with E(eit)=0 and 
Var(eit)= E(eit)
2
=σei
2
 for each stock i 
 
The coefficients a and β are calculated after running a regression with the 
ordinary least squares method (OLS) between Rit and Rmt. In view of that, the 
equation (5.2) takes the following form:  
êit = Rit- [âi+ βi Rmt]    (5.3) 
Consequently, the abnormal returns are computed after subtracting the 
market portfolio return from the actual stock return. At this point it is essential to 
point out that Rmt is the market portfolio return on day t of the general index of the 
Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). We choose a control portfolio of firms (stocks) 
that are not subjected to the event. The rationale for that is to have a better 
matching for the firms that are involved in a seasoned equity offering process. 
 
5.1.2. The mean- adjusted model 
In the mean-adjusted model, the expected returns are computed with the use 
of the mean of returns of stock i. The abnormal returns of stock i are given by the 
formula: 
êit = Rit- Ȓi       (5.4) 
 
with Ȓ calculated as: 
Ȓi=  
and with n signifying the number of daily returns for the examined period. 
 
5.1.3. The market- adjusted model 
An alternative procedure to compute the abnormal return of a stock i is to 
employ the market-adjusted model. To accomplish this, we calculate the 
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difference between the actual return of stock i on day t and the market portfolio 
return on day t. Thus: 
êit = Rit- Rmt      (5.5) 
A significant conjecture that is taken into consideration here is that the 
expected returns for each period t remain the same with the actual stock returns 
(Rit= Rmt) but not essentially constant.  
 
5.1.4. Model selection 
In our study we measure the actual stock market reaction surrounding ex-
rights days by applying the market-adjusted model. The selection lies upon the 
simplicity of the model.  
The next step of the methodology is to apply the market-adjusted model in 
order to estimate the expected returns of the sample. We set as examined period 
20 days surrounding the ex-right day, so the event window is [t=-10, t=+10]. An 
event period that is too short cannot capture all price pressures, while an event 
period that is too long can be contaminated with other significant corporate 
events. For that reason, we opted the 20-day event period. 
The abnormal return of each security is the difference between the actual 
return and the expected return on day t, shown in function (5.1), of the event study 
methodology requires, for each day and each group separately, and represents the 
performance of each stock attributed to the seasoned equity offering ex-rights day.  
One step further, we use the Average Abnormal Return (AAR) with the 
purpose of removing any confounding effects that can contaminate the event of 
seasoned equity offerings. For our sample, the Average Abnormal Return of each 
day t is defined as:  
AAR= ēit=  
Where 
t=-10, -9,…0,…+9,+10  
N= number of stocks in the sample the particular day 
The analysis of abnormal returns contains also the calculation of the 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR). For N shares of the sample and 
for the period from t1 to t2 CAAR is then estimated as: 
CAAR (t1,t2)=  
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The day 0 is the ex-rights date, t1 is the first date of our calculations and t2 is 
the last day of our calculations. The estimation of CAARs regards not only the 
whole sample period but individual event windows as well, for different time 
intervals pre and post ex-right day.  So we define nine different event windows 
which are: CAAR (-10,+10), CAAR (-10,-1), CAAR (+1,+10), CAAR (-5,+5), 
CAAR (-5,0), CAAR (+1,+5), CAAR (-1,+1), CAAR (-1,0) and CAAR (0,+1).At 
this point, we calculate CAARs in order to detect possible information leakages or 
sluggish market reaction around ex-rights dates. However, a drawback of CAARs 
is that employing this investment approach in actual calendar time, presumes that 
investors are informed about all events over the sample period at the start of the 
period.  
 
5.1.5. Test Statistics 
Using test statistics we attempt to assess the null hypothesis of no 
significant AARs and CAARs around ex-rights dates.  
The test that we apply to corroborate if the abnormal returns for each stock i 
are statistically different from zero is the t- statistic. The application of the t-
student statistic is realised under the assumption that stock returns for each firm 
follow a t- student distribution. The null hypothesis is that the average abnormal 
return on day t=0 are zero with the alternative hypothesis being that the average 
abnormal return AAR of day 0 are different from zero.. As it is concluded, the test 
is two sided, thus, the null hypothesis is rejected when t-student > 1.66 at 
significance level a=10% or t-student >1.95 at confidence level a=5% or in the 
last occurrence when t-student>2.56 at significance level a=1%. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected there is evidence that the seasoned equity offering produces 
significant market reaction on ex-rights date. The formulas for t-statistic are: 
tAAR=  
tCAAR=  
where 
T=t2-t1+1: the number of time points of the event window with t1 and t2 being the 
first and the last day of CAAR calculations respectively. 
S(AARt): the  standard deviation of the portfolio of the average abnormal returns 
for the estimated period computed as:  
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S(AARt)=  
 
5.1.6. Tested hypothesis for stock prices 
The issue of seasoned equity offerings may bring about some adjustments in 
stock prices after the ex-rights date. These price adjustments may be positive, 
negative or neutral.   
 No change in stock price (neutral reaction) 
The stock price will remain unchanged after an SEO issuance and 
unaffected by factors different than cash influx. The stock price neutrality occurs 
due to the fact that the market is considered to be efficient, because there are 
substitute stocks and also because needs for investments are stable.   
 A stock price increase (positive reaction) 
A raise in capital is regarded as a positive event in the market and in most 
cases is a token of prosperity and further growth for the company. If such 
information is revealed, the effects are possible to generate a stock price increase.  
 A stock price decrease (negative reaction) 
Information regarding equity issuance can be perceived negatively by the 
market, reflecting weak performance for the company. According to the price 
pressure hypothesis, an increase in share‟s supply, which is the outcome of the 
equity offering, decreases their price since the demand curve for a firm‟s shares is 
down slopping. (Tsangarakis, 1996) 
 
5.1.7.  Long-run Performance 
With regard to the long term analysis, we focus on the change of a number 
of ratios of different categories. Accounting ratios recognize irregularities, 
abnormalities and surprises that compel for additional examination to ascertain the 
current and future financial standing of the firm. This constitutes the underlying 
motive that we choose to study their activity. (Elliott, B. and Elliot, J., 2006) 
 
5.1.8. Ratio Selection 
At the outset, we are persistent with the same sub-samples, the financial, the 
non financial and the full sample as well. What succeeds at this point of the 
analysis is the selection of ratios. It should be noted that we study indicatively a 
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small number of ratios that are based on the past research. Ratios describe the 
relationship between items in financial statements. Obviously, we can calculate a 
number of ratios from a set of financial statements. Our selection depends on the 
availability of data, since there were restricted data, mainly for financial firms. 
Moreover, we attempt analyse ratios that are directly related to capital raise.  
First, we investigate profitability ratios, as this category of ratios allows for 
specific assessment of a business‟ capacity to generate earnings as compared to 
expenses over a particular time period. The profitability ratios that are employed 
in our study are the return on assets (ROA), the return on capital (ROC), the 
return on common equity (ROE) and the asset turnover. Second, we analyse 
leverage ratios. Leverage ratios express the company‟s methods of financing 
financial obligations or measuring the ability to meet them. They also illustrate 
the capital structure of a firm. For our purpose, we use financial leverage, total 
debt to total equity, total debt to total assets and total debt to total capital. Finally, 
in an attempt to examine for firms‟ effects, the investigation also presents changes 
in some investment ratios such as the book value per share, the total capital, the 
total debt and the price to earnings ratio (PE ratio).  
The next step is to specify the period under investigation. We define as the 
year event (ex-rights year) the year 0. We investigate differences in ratios between 
pre and post-SEOs periods. Hence, the analysis measure the percentage 
differences or changes in those variables in the year of the ex-rights date of SEO 
(year 0) and in the first two full fiscal years after the SEO (years + 1 and + 2) 
compared to the preceding fiscal year of the SEO (year -1). To be more specific, 
the time windows that are examined are [-1,0], [-1,+1] and [-1,+2]. 
 
5.1.9. The mean test 
To test mean and median differences in ratios between years surrounding 
the ex-right year we apply the test of equality method. Consistent with the first 
one, for each ratio and each year we compute the mean and the percentage 
difference from one year to another. Then we perform the two-tailed test for 
checking equality in the population means that underlie each sample. This 
analysis tool applies a paired two-sample Student‟s t-Test to ascertain whether 
observations that are taken prior to the ex-right date of SEO and observations 
taken subsequent to the ex-right date of SEO are likely to have come from 
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distributions with equal population means. A paired test is utilized when there is a 
natural pairing of observations in the samples, such as when a sample group is 
tested twice, before and after an experiment, which for us is the equity issue. This 
t-test type does not presume that the variances of both populations are equal. 
(Wikipedia, 2010) 
 
5.1.10. The median test 
The second test assesses the significance of medians. We primarily compute 
the medians for each ratio and for each year and their percentage change from 
year to year. The medians of changes are used as a measure of performance. 
Medians are used to permit for the possibility that outliers will dominate the 
means in the small sample analyzed. Then, using the E-Views econometric 
software, we apply the non-parametric Mann Whitney test (or Wilcoxon test) for 
assessing the significance of medians. The Mann-Whitney test is a non-parametric 
test and concerns the investigation of two independent populations, which in this 
case is the ratio of two different fiscal years. Furthermore, it is a test of both 
location and shape. Given two independent samples, it tests whether one variable 
have a propensity to enclose values higher than the other variable. The test is 
often presented as an alternative to a t test when the data are not normally 
distributed. In contrast with a t test, which tests the population means, the Mann-
Whitney test is generally considered as a test of population medians. However, 
there is a raging controversy about this statement and treating it as such can lead 
to insufficient analysis of data. (Wikipedia, 2010) 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1. Short-term analysis: Share price behavior 
6.1.1. Financial firms 
Employing the market-adjusted return method, we calculate daily average 
abnormal returns and the cumulative average abnormal returns 20 days 
surrounding the ex-rights date (t=-10 to t=+10). Table 2 displays the results for 
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the sub-sample of financial firms (54 rights issues). More specifically, the first 
column of panel A lists the trading days t=-10 to t=+10, the second column 
presents the average abnormal returns (AAR%) for each day in percentages, the 
third column shows the daily cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) and 
the fourth column indicates the corresponding t-statistics for the average abnormal 
returns. The t-statistics display whether the average abnormal returns are 
statistically significant. Moreover, in panel B we compute the t-statistics of the 
cumulative average abnormal returns around different time intervals such as 
CAAR (-1 0), CAAR (0 +1), CAAR (-1 +1) and CAAR (-5 0).  
The average abnormal return at the ex-right date (t=0) equals to 1.423%, 
which is statistically significant at the 5% level. Clearly, the average abnormal 
returns preceding the ex-right date, appear to undulate at low levels with the only 
exception of the average abnormal return on day t=-5 which is 0.907, statistically 
significant at the 10% level (t= 1.90) and the return on day t=-2 which is negative 
(-0.731) and statistically significant at the 5% level. In post- ex-right period we 
observe that most of the average abnormal returns have a negative sign. 
Indicatively, on day t=+4 abnormal returns are negative (-0.760) and statistically 
significant at the level of 5%. Cumulative average abnormal returns of two, three 
and six days are all positive but statistically insignificant. In specific, cumulative 
abnormal returns are positive and take their maximum values as they approach to 
the ex-rights date. Based on these findings the hypothesis of zero ex-right 
abnormal returns is, therefore, rejected.  
 
Table 2: Average daily abnormal returns for the event window around the ex-
rights date for the sub-sample of financial firms. 
Panel A: Abnormal returns around the ex-rights date 
Days AAR% CAAR t-statistic 
-10 0.564 0.5641 1.06 
-9 0.341 0.9053 0.94 
-8 -0.388 0.5176 -1.28 
-7 0.193 0.7109 0.44 
-6 0.278 0.9889 0.62 
-5 0.907* 1.8958 1.90 
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-4 0.509 2.4048 1.49 
-3 0.241 2.6456 0.77 
-2 -0.731** 1.9147 -2.53 
-1 -0.751 1.1639 -1.41 
0 1.423** 2.5871 2.30 
1 -0.461 2.1262 -0.98 
2 -0.692 1.4346 -1.93 
3 -0.630 0.8047 -1.18 
4 -0.760** 0.0446 -2.25 
5 -0.301 -0.2562 -0.83 
6 -0.028 -0.2845 -0.07 
7 0.321 0.0363 1.15 
8 0.448 0.4847 1.48 
9 0.159 0.6442 0.57 
10 0.057 0.7013 0.18 
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns around the ex-rights date. 
Days CAARs % t-statistic 
CAR (-1, 0) 0.672 0.80 
CAR (0, +1) 0.962 1.15 
CAR (-1, +1) 0.211 0.21 
CAR (-5, 0 ) 1.598 1.10 
Note: This table shows the abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample firms for 21 days 
around the ex-rights date (t=0). * indicates a significant difference from zero at the 10% 
level, ** indicates a significant difference from zero at the 5% level and *** indicates a 
significant difference from zero at the 1% level 
 
 
The average abnormal return at the ex-right date (t=0) equals to 1.423, 
which is statistically significant at the conventional 5% level. Clearly, the average 
abnormal returns preceding the ex-right date, appear to undulate at low levels with 
only exceptions the average abnormal return at day t=-5 which is 0.907 
statistically significant at 10% level (t= 1.90) and the return at day t=-2 which is 
negative(-0.731) but statistically significant at 5% level. At the days right after the 
ex-right date we observe that most of the average abnormal returns experience 
negative variations. Indicatively, at day t=+4 abnormal returns are negative (-
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0.760) and statistically significant at the level of 5%.The maximum price of the 
abnormal returns is that of the ex-right date (AR=1.423) and the minimum at day 
t=+4. Cumulative average abnormal returns of two, three and six days are all 
positive but statistically insignificant. Visibly, cumulative abnormal returns are 
positive and take their maximum values as they approach to the ex-rights date. 
Based on these findings the hypothesis of zero ex-right abnormal returns is, 
therefore rejected.  
 
6.1.2. Non-financial firms 
 Table 3 displays the results from sample of non-financial firms. The sub-
sample includes 256 rights issues over the period 1999-2006. The average 
abnormal return on day t=0 is positive and equals to 0.844%, however, 
statistically insignificant at any conventional level. However, the day following 
the ex-right date presents the maximum positive value of the abnormal returns 
being 0.860%and statistically significant at the 1% level. In the pre ex-rights 
period, the average abnormal returns appear to be positive, but statistically 
insignificant. On the other hand, the returns following the ex-right date present 
negative sign and statistical insignificance. Only on day t=+6 the average 
abnormal return is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Cumulative average abnormal returns of two days CAAR (-1, 0) are positive 
(0.614%) but statistically insignificant. In contrast, cumulative abnormal returns 
of two days CAAR (0, 1) are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The three days cumulative abnormal returns have a positive sing (CAAR 
=1.474%) and are statistically significant at the 5% level. As regards to the six 
days cumulative abnormal returns, the CAAR is positive (0.991%) but statistically 
insignificant. The results reported above provide compelling evidence for the 
acceptance of null hypothesis since the abnormal returns at the ex-right date come 
out to be insignificant 
 
Table 3: Average daily abnormal returns for the event window around the ex-
rights date for the sub-sample of non-financial firms 
Panel A: Abnormal returns around the ex-rights date 
Days AAR% CAAR t- statistic 
-10 -0.256 -0.2561 -1.34 
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-9 -0.202 -0.4583 -0.96 
-8 0.019 -0.4390 0.09 
-7 0.341 -0.0979 1.63 
-6 0.159 0.0607 0.74 
-5 0.128 0.1892 0.57 
-4 0.180 0.3689 0.87 
-3 0.094 0.4630 0.41 
-2 -0.025 0.4376 -0.10 
-1 -0.230 0.2074 -0.90 
0 0.844 1.0514 1.32 
1 0.860*** 1.9112 3.01 
2 0.306 2.2170 1.23 
3 -0.076 2.1408 -0.33 
4 -0.183 1.9580 -0.86 
5 -0.313 1.6448 -1.45 
6 -0.412* 1.2329 -1.75 
7 0.125 1.3581 0.56 
8 -0.009 1.3488 -0.05 
9 -0.269 1.0800 -1.30 
10 -0.116 0.9636 -0.55 
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns around the ex-rights date. 
Days CAARs % t-statistic 
 
CAR (-1, 0) 0.614 1.29 
 
CAR (0, +1) 1.704*** 3.58 
 
CAR (-1, +1) 1.474** 2.53 
 
CAR (-5, 0 ) 0.991 1.20 
 
Note: This table shows the abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample firms for 21 days 
around the ex-rights date (t=0). * indicates a significant difference from zero at the 10% 
level, ** indicates a significant difference from zero at the 5% level and *** indicates a 
significant difference from zero at the 1% level. 
 
 
6.1.3. Full sample  
  Finally, Table 4 provides the results for the full sample including 
both financial and non-financial firms. The full sample comprises 310 
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observations. The results show positive average abnormal returns at the ex-right 
date equal to 0.945% and statistically significant at the 10% level. Once again, the 
day +1, the abnormal returns are positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level. The days preceding the ex-right date t=0 demonstrate more or less positive 
abnormal returns, but statistically insignificant except for day -7 which has a 
positive AAR of 0.315%, statistically significant at the 10% level (t=1.67). In 
general, the average abnormal returns around the ex-right date display 
insignificant returns, while several of them report a negative sign. For instance, on 
day +6 the AAR is equal to -0.345 and statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Cumulative average abnormal returns of two days CAAR (-1, 0) are positive, but 
statistically insignificant (t=1.36). These results are in contrast to those of CAAR 
(0, 1) which are also positive but statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Similarly, the three days cumulative abnormal returns display a positive reaction 
which is statistically significant at the 5% level. Finally, the CAAR (-5, 0) is 
positive but statistically insignificant. These findings reject the null hypothesis of 
zero ex-rights abnormal returns. 
 
 
Table 4:  Average daily abnormal returns for the event window around the ex-
rights date for the full sample. 
Panel A: Abnormal returns around the ex-rights date 
Days AAR% CAAR t-statistic 
-10 -0.113 -0.1132 -0.61 
-9 -0.108 -0.2208 -0.58 
-8 -0.052 -0.2723 -0.28 
-7 0.315* 0.0430 1.67 
-6 0.179 0.2224 0.93 
-5 0.264 0.4865 1.30 
-4 0.237 0.7235 1.31 
-3 0.120 0.8432 0.61 
-2 -0.148 0.6949 -0.69 
-1 -0.321 0.3740 -1.39 
0 0.945* 1.3189 1.75 
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1 0.630** 1.9486 2.51 
2 0.132 2.0807 0.61 
3 -0.173 1.9080 -0.82 
4 -0.283 1.6247 -1.52 
5 -0.311 1.3137 -1.65 
6 -0.345* 0.9686 -1.69 
7 0.159 1.1279 0.83 
8 0.070 1.1983 0.40 
9 -0.194 1.0040 -1.09 
10 -0.086 0.9179 -0.47 
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns around the ex-rights date. 
Days CAARs % t-statistic 
CAR (-1, 0) 0.624 1.36 
CAR (0, +1) 1.575*** 3.44 
CAR (-1, +1) 1.254** 2.24 
CAR (-5, 0 ) 1.097 1.38 
Note: This table shows the abnormal returns (AARs) for the sample firms for 21 days 
around the ex-rights date (t=0). * indicates a significant difference from zero at the 10% 
level, ** indicates a significant difference from zero at the 5% level and *** indicates a 
significant difference from zero at the 1% level. 
 
 
6.1.4. Analysis of results 
Looking at the above results we notice that the null hypothesis of zero ex-
date abnormal returns is rejected for financial firms and for the full sample. 
Financial firms and the full sample experience positive and statistically significant 
abnormal returns on day 0 whereas non-financial firms present positive but 
statistically insignificant returns.  
The days preceding the ex-rights date we find positive abnormal returns for 
all sub- categories, however, insignificant. On the other hand, the days following 
the ex-right date show negative returns but in most cases statistically insignificant.  
The two and three days cumulative average abnormal returns CAAR (0, 1) 
and CAAR (-1, +1) are positive and statistically significant for the whole sample. 
These results corroborate the findings of earlier studies that SEOs issuance is 
associated with positive share price reaction (Goyal, 1994). Considering the six 
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days cumulative returns, they are positive but insignificant in all cases. In 
particular, the CAAR of days−5 to 0 do not provide any confirmations of price 
adjustment before the examined event. Looking at the speed of the share price 
adjustment to the new information emanating from SEOs announcements for non 
financial firms, we observe that there is no sluggish reaction to SEOs issuances. 
This is attributable to the fact that observations are statistically insignificant.  
The results for the non-financial firms appear to support the proposition that 
there are no statistically significant abnormal stock returns when stock began to 
trade ex-rights. Thus, it is expected that all information is incorporated into stock 
prices on the day of the first announcement (the day the rights offerings are 
publicly announced). That means that the stock price at the ex-date carries no 
information about the future prospects of the company. The result corroborate the 
findings of Tsangarakis (1993) who also found that there are no abnormal returns 
at the ex-right date and supports the hypothesis that the Greek market is efficient 
in the semi-strong form. Additionally, McGuiness (2001) and Smith (1977) point 
out that the abnormal returns at the ex-date are insignificant. The results from the 
sample of financial firms and from the full sample are in contrast to the results 
from the sample of non-financial firms.In specific, we find positive and 
statistically significant abnormal returns at the ex-rights date suggesting that new 
information is conveyed to investors.  
In sum, we suggest that the abnormal returns before and after the ex-date of 
the right issues do not present statistical significance. The insignificant reaction of 
the market, before and after the ex-right date, can be attributed to the fact that the 
announcement date of the SEO issuance precedes the ex-rights date and much of 
the information released by SEOs has already been absorbed by the market.. 
Moreover, taking into account the unique characteristics of the ASE, our results 
suggest that the Greek stock market responds quickly and efficiently to corporate 
news contained in SEOs subscriptions. The high proportions of stock held by 
insiders (e.g. family) and the limited floating of Greek listed firms are alleged to 
deprive much of the information contained in SEOs around ex-rights dates  
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6.2. Long –run  Performance 
This section examines whether seasoned equity offerings induce changes to 
the firm performance, corporate leverage and investment behavior. For our 
purpose, we analyze some ratios that are:  
A. Profitability  
 Return on assets 
 Asset turnover 
 Return on capital 
 Return on common equity 
B. Leverage 
 Total debt to total assets 
 Financial leverage 
 Total debt to total equity 
 Total debt to total capital 
C. Investment 
 Book value per share 
 Total capital 
 Total debt  
 PE ratio 
 
Before analyzing the above ratios we define each ratio. Return on assets 
(ROA) is an indicator of how profitable a company is, relative to its total assets. 
ROA reveals the capability of managers to generate earnings by using the firm‟s 
assets. Asset turnover informs us on how competent a company is in generating 
sales or revenue via its assets. Return on capital employed (ROCE) implies the 
return that we get when the value of a capital asset increases. Return on common 
equity (ROE) indicates how much profit a company makes with the money 
shareholders have invested in.  
In the leverage category, total debt to total assets (D/TA) is a metric of how 
much of the company‟s assets have been financed by debt. It is considered to be a 
determinant of financial risk. Moreover, financial leverage indicates the extent to 
which the business relies on debt financing. Total debt to total equity (D/E) 
measures a company‟s ability to borrow and repay money. Total debt to total 
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capital (D/TC) gives users an idea of a company‟s financial structure, or how it 
is financing its operations. Regarding investments ratios, book value per share 
(BV) is typically used by owners of shares to settle on the level of safety that is 
linked to each stock after all debts are paid accordingly. Total capital, which 
includes long-term debt and common and preferred shares, refers to financial 
resources available for use. Ongoing with total debt, it consists of the short-term 
and the long-term debt of a company. Finally, the P/E ratio examines the 
relationship among the stock price and the company‟s earnings. The P/E is the 
most popular metric of stock analysis (Investopedia, 2010). 
 
6.2.1. Financial Firms 
Table 5 summarizes the results for financial firms considering the 
alterations in profitability, leverage and investment ratios for periods t=-1 to t=0, 
t=-1 to t=+1 and t=-1 to t=+2.  
 
Table 5: Mean and Median changes for financial firms‟ ratios for intervals (-1,0), 
(-1,1), (-1,2). 
Panel A Year -1  to Year 0 
Performance 
Mean 
difference 
t-Test p 
Value 
 
Median 
difference 
Wilcoxon p 
Value 
ROA 0.21 0.749 0.19 0.2308 
Asset Turnover -0.03 0.038 -0.01 0.4495 
Return On Cap 0.04 0.980 0.09 0.3010 
Return Com Eqy 0.87 0.817 0.04 0.8335 
Leverage 
    
Tot Debt To Tot Asset 0.64 0.686 3.99 0.7354 
Fncl Lvrg -0.99 0.095 -0.04 0.6386 
Tot Debt To Tot Eqy 2.78 0.915 4.02 0.8933 
Tot Debt To Tot Cap -0.94 0.739 0.00 0.9778 
Investment ratios 
    
Book Val Per Share 0.87 0.208 0.19 0.2930 
Tot Capital 1491.20 0.000 117.98 0.3501 
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Tot Debt 1333.12 0.001 192.93 0.4268 
PE Ratio -13.46 0.058 -2.27 0.2525 
Panel B Year -1  to Year 1 
Performance 
Mean 
difference 
t-Test p Value 
 
Median 
difference 
% difference 
ROA -0.35 0.633 0.19 0.6168 
Asset Turnover -0.03 0.019 -0.01 0.3219 
Return On Cap -0.27 0.735 -0.35 0.9871 
Return Com Eqy -3.30 0.260 -0.13 0.6290 
Leverage 
    
Tot Debt To Tot Asset 4.04 0.018 6.72 0.0981 
Fncl Lvrg -0.56 0.515 1.06 0.9893 
Tot Debt To Tot Eqy 85.29 0.019 118.11 0.0567 
Tot Debt To Tot Cap 6.86 0.052 9.08 0.0314 
Investment ratios 
    
Book Val Per Share 0.63 0.362 0.30 0.2897 
Tot Capital 2805.71 0.000 789.84 0.1302 
Tot Debt 2641.13 0.000 1770.16 0.0774 
PE Ratio -12.36 0.133 -2.12 0.3204 
Panel C Year -1  to Year 2 
Performance 
Mean 
difference 
t-Test p Value 
 
Median 
difference 
Wilcoxon p 
Value 
ROA -0.89 0.468 0.03 0.7560 
Asset Turnover -0.05 0.007 -0.01 0.1008 
Return On Cap -3.15 0.093 -0.51 0.1725 
Return Com Eqy -4.45 0.370 0.46 0.0079 
Leverage 
    
Tot Debt To Tot Asset 7.40 0.000 9.35 0.2850 
Fncl Lvrg 1.35 0.235 1.29 0.0002 
Tot Debt To Tot Eqy 149.36 0.000 204.90 0.0002 
Tot Debt To Tot Cap 12.14 0.000 12.60 0.0002 
Investment ratios 
    
Book Val Per Share 0.48 0.563 0.23 0.3998 
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Tot Capital 4185.71 0.000 3057.52 0.0322 
Tot Debt 4182.43 0.000 3625.15 0.0077 
PE Ratio -5.88 0.622 -4.00 0.0479 
 
 
We test whether the subscription of SEOs may induce changes in the 
profitability, the leverage and the investments of a company. For the first time 
interval (-1, 0), which is depicted in panel A, we find that profitability in financial 
firms experiences an increase, statistically insignificant though. In particular, the 
mean return on assets presents a change of 0.21 from year t=-1 to year t=0. This 
change is statistically insignificant according to the paired two sample t-test. The 
median difference between these two years is 0.19, also statistically insignificant 
based on the Wilcoxon signed rank test. As regards to the second profitability 
ratio, asset turnover, we note that the mean difference between the year before the 
rights offer and the year event (year 0) is -0.03 which is statistically significant at 
the 5% level. Concerning the median, we see that there is a statistically 
insignificant reduction of 0.01. Looking at the return on capital and return on 
common equity ratios we observe a similar pattern as ROA with slight 
insignificant increases in both means and medians.  
The leverage displays both increases and decreases, however, statistically 
insignificant. Total debt to total assets indicates a median percentage change of 
24% while total debt to total capital and total debt to total equity, is attested to 
have minor changes in the percentages of means and medians. The next ratio, 
financial leverage, exhibits a statistically significant decrease of -0.99. The 
median raw difference is -0.04, statistically insignificant though. 
Regarding investments ratios, they appear to have an upward trend in the 
post-SEO period. In specific, the mean difference of book value per share is 
positive (0.87) but insignificant. Correspondingly, the median change is 0.19, 
statistically insignificant as well.  Concerning total capital, the mean experiences a 
significant increase, whilst the median increase is insignificant. The results are 
similar for total debt. The mean PE ratio presents a significant decline of -41% for 
the mean and the median PE undergoes a reduction of -13%, statistically 
insignificant though. 
 Panel B illustrates the results during the second period of time under 
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investigation (t=-1 to t=+1). Financial firms indicate a downward tendency in 
profitability. In particular, ROA exhibits a mean change of -0.35 but statistically 
insignificant and a median change steady and equal to 0.19. Return on capital and 
return on common equity drop insignificantly. However, asset turnover ratio 
experiences a significant fall from year -1 to year +1. 
On the other hand, leverage appears to increase significantly from year -1 to 
year +1. In general, ratios demonstrate a significant growing behavior, in some 
occasions at great levels. Pinpointing total debt to total assets for example, the 
mean difference is 4.04 and statistically significant at the 5% level and the median 
difference is 6.72 and statistically significant at the 10% level. This result is quite 
different from those of the previous period where the median is unaffected. 
  The same pattern is applied in the investment ratios although the results are 
insignificant in most cases. The book value per share remains unchanged from 
year -1 to year +1 with both mean and median values appearing to have an 
increase of 0.63 and 0.30, respectively. Pertaining to total capital the mean 
increases significantly by 70% at the 1% level. The median indicates a rise of 
32% which is, however, statistically insignificant. Furthermore, the mean and 
median of total debt have increased by 80% and 96%, respectively. The levels of 
significance are 1% for the mean and 10% for the median. The mean PE ratio 
experiences a significant decline of -43% and the median PE ratio exhibits a fall 
of -12% over the years t=-1 to t=1. Both decreases are statistically insignificant. 
Panel C contains the results from year -1 to year +2. It seems that 
profitability dwindles in year +2. The mean percentage differences fluctuate at 
high levels compared to those of median ones that undulate at lower levels. 
Nevertheless, the results are statistically insignificant; hence, we are not able to 
reach at safe conclusion. For instance, the ROA difference for the mean is -0.89 
and for the median   0.03. Both changes are statistically insignificant. 
 As regards to the leverage, we report statistically significant improvement 
on the whole. Total debt to total assets show an increase of 7.40 in mean, which is 
statistically significant at 1% level. The median increases by 9.35.  Total debt to 
total equity experience a mean increase of 57% statistically significant at the 1% 
level and the median indicates a huge increase of 99% statistically significant at 
the 1% level as well. 
 An upward trend dominates investments with statistically significant 
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observations in most cases. For example, total capital exhibits a positive and 
statistically significant mean change of 105%. The median follows the same 
pattern with an increase of 123%, statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Likewise, two years after the seasoned equity offering we observe a mean debt 
change of 123%, statistically significant at the 1% level and a median debt change 
of 190% also statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
 
6.2.2. Non-Financial Firms 
 Table 6 reports the changes in ratios for the sample of non-financial firms. 
The structure of the table is similar to the previous one. 
 
Table 6: Mean and Median changes for non- financial firms‟ ratios for intervals (-
1,0),(-1,1)(-1,2). 
Panel A Year -1  to Year 0 
Performance 
Mean 
difference 
t-Test p Value 
 
Median 
difference 
Wilcoxon 
p Value 
ROA -0.05 0.930 -0.48 0.3327 
Asset Turnover -0.09 0.000 -0.09 0.0687 
Return On Cap -1.76 0.013 -1.53 0.0398 
Return Com Eqy 0.00 0.999 -1.58 0.1877 
Leverage 
    
Tot Debt To Tot Asset -4.95 0.000 -7.25 0.0026 
Fncl Lvrg -0.11 0.580 -0.11 0.3039 
Tot Debt To Tot Eqy -10.47 0.033 -15.75 0.0419 
Tot Debt To Tot Cap -2.80 0.052 -7.10 0.0718 
Investment ratios 
    
Book Val Per Share 0.72 0.001 0.45 0.0006 
Tot Capital 50.02 0.000 22.53 0.0069 
Tot Debt 15.43 0.016 3.60 0.2042 
PE Ratio 13.62 0.250 4.64 0.2803 
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Panel B Year -1  to Year 1 
Performance 
Mean 
difference 
t-Test p Value 
 
Median 
difference 
Wilcoxon 
p Value 
ROA -1.80 0.001 -1.54 0.0007 
Asset Turnover -0.08 0.004 -0.07 0.0399 
Return On Cap -4.22 0.000 -4.11 0.0000 
Return Com Eqy -4.97 0.001 -4.19 0.0001 
Leverage 
    
Tot Debt To Tot Asset -0.24 0.829 -0.55 0.7017 
Fncl Lvrg -2.46 0.349 -0.11 0.5450 
Tot Debt To Tot Eqy 4.04 0.550 -2.65 0.6486 
Tot Debt To Tot Cap 2.85 0.080 0.48 0.6704 
Investment ratios 
    
Book Val Per Share 0.45 0.115 0.56 0.0004 
Tot Capital 105.50 0.000 44.90 0.0001 
Tot Debt 42.74 0.003 13.54 0.0021 
PE Ratio 62.58 0.376 -1.51 0.3034 
Panel C Year -1  to Year 2 
Performance 
Mean 
difference 
t-Test p Value 
 
Median 
difference 
Wilcoxon 
p Value 
ROA -21.82 0.027 -0.60 0.1966 
Asset Turnover -0.06 0.519 -0.09 0.04557 
Return On Cap -5.93 0.000 -4.50 0.0000 
Return Com Eqy -7.22 0.001 -5.19 0.0000 
Leverage 
    
Tot Debt To Tot Asset 1.10 0.380 0.45 0.6313 
Fncl Lvrg -3.43 0.334 0.04 0.3057 
Tot Debt To Tot Eqy 47.94 0.089 4.18 0.1987 
Tot Debt To Tot Cap 3.94 0.071 3.06 0.1281 
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Investment ratios 
    
Book Val Per Share 7.56 0.286 0.45 0.0007 
Tot Capital 240.06 0.066 46.68 0.0000 
Tot Debt 79.49 0.000 21.99 0.0000 
PE Ratio -15.82 0.190 -5.42 0.0096 
 
 
Panel A displays the results from the group of non-financial firms for the 
period t=-1 to t=0). We observe that profitability experiences a weak decline. To 
begin with return on assets, we observe a mean change of -0.05. The change is 
statistically insignificant according to the t-test. The median difference between 
these two years is -0.48, statistically insignificant as well, based on the Wilcoxon 
signed rank test. As regards to asset turnover, we note that the mean difference 
between the year before the rights offer and the event year is -11% and the median 
is -12%. The results for the return on capital are in the same line with the asset 
turnover, whereas the return on common equity remains unchanged. 
In contrast, leverage undergoes a statistically significant reduction. The 
mean difference considering total debt to total assets is negative (-4.95) and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The same result is detected for the median, 
notwithstanding to the larger decline (-24%).  Similar to those results, total debt to 
total equity and total debt to total capital present the same negative response to the 
SEOs issue.  
Concerning investment ratios, we point out a rise which is statistically 
significant in most observations. More specific, for the book value per share we 
note a mean change of 30% which is statistically significant at the 1% level. With 
a slight difference the median shows a significant change of 32%. Total capital is 
in line with book value ratio. Once more, PE ratio differentiates from the other 
three ratios of the group with a statistically insignificant increase in both mean 
and median values. 
At the next combination of years, t=-1 to t=+1 (Panel B), profitability ratios 
decreases significantly. Clearly, in all cases, we observe an overall downturn. An 
outstanding case is the return on capital where the year of issue is included; we 
observe a reduction of -4.22 and -4.11 for the mean and median, respectively. 
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Both of them are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 Similar behavior is detected in leverage although the changes are 
statistically insignificant. Akin to the previous time interval, for the years-1 and 
+1, the mean and median of financial leverage continue to decline monotonically 
to the peak of -88% and -5%, respectively. 
As regards to investment ratios we detect positive changes. A case that 
exemplifies this reaction is total debt which has a mean of 53% and a median of 
68%. Both changes are statistically significant at the 1% level.  The mean of total 
capital changes by 54% whereas the median changes by 73%. Both differences are 
statistically significant at the level of 1%. 
With reference to the last period of time under investigation (-1 to +2) as 
shown in Panel C, we find that profitability diminishes significantly. We observe 
that both mean and median return on capital decreases statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Similarly, return on common equity declines at higher levels (-65% 
and -52%). 
Two years after the seasoned equity offering the variations in mean and median 
total debt to total assets ratio alter their sign, but remain insignificant. In addition, 
the mean of financial leverage decreases by -122%, although this decrease is 
statistically insignificant. In stark contrast, the median experiences a slight 
increase of 2%. Total debt to total capital indicates an increase of 11% in mean, 
statistically significant at 10% level and the median a smaller and insignificant 
rise of 8%. 
Looking at the investment ratios, we observe insignificant improvement in 
most cases. The mean book value per share documents an insignificant rise and 
the median remains unaffected. Finally, the mean total debt rises by 96% and the 
median by 110%. 
 
  
6.2.3. Full Sample 
 Table 7 summarizes the results for the full sample related to the changes in 
profitability, leverage and investment ratios. 
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Table 7 Mean and Median changes for full sample ratios for intervals (-1,0), 
(1,1), (-1,2). 
Panel A Year -1  to Year 0 
Performance 
Mean 
difference 
t-Test p Value 
 
Median 
difference 
Wilcoxon p 
Value 
ROA -0.89 0.982 0.03 0.4583 
Asset Turnover -0.05 0.000 -0.01 0.1251 
Return On Cap -3.15 0.030 -0.51 01288 
Return Com Eqy -4.45 0.925 0.46 0.2583 
Leverage 
    
Tot Debt To Tot 
Asset 
7.40 0.000 9.35 0.0078 
Fncl Lvrg 1.35 0.183 1.29 0.3792 
Tot Debt To Tot Eqy 149.36 0.158 204.90 0.0666 
Tot Debt To Tot Cap 12.14 0.053 12.60 0.1232 
Investment ratios 
    
Book Val Per Share 0.48 0.001 0.23 0.0009 
Tot Capital 4185.71 0.000 3057.52 0.0120 
Tot Debt 4182.43 0.001 3625.15 0.2340 
PE Ratio -5.88 0.350 -4.00 0.5134 
Panel B Year -1  to Year 1 
Performance 
Mean 
difference 
t-Test p Value 
 
Median 
difference 
Wilcoxon p 
Value 
ROA -1.57 0.001 -1.52 0.0019 
Asset Turnover -0.07 0.002 -0.04 0.0754 
Return On Cap -3.43 0.000 -3.60 0.0003 
Return Com Eqy -4.70 0.001 -4.15 0.0001 
Leverage 
    
Tot Debt To Tot 
Asset 
0.47 0.626 0.89 0.8520 
Fncl Lvrg -2.14 0.328 -0.08 0.6063 
Tot Debt To Tot Eqy 17.47 0.035 -0.04 0.9569 
Tot Debt To Tot Cap 3.54 0.017 0.19 0.3965 
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Investment ratios 
    
Book Val Per Share 0.48 0.068 0.52 0.0008 
Tot Capital 581.44 0.000 53.04 0.0005 
Tot Debt 458.10 0.000 23.58 0.0048 
PE Ratio 52.20 0.391 -2.31 0.2292 
Panel C Year -1  to Year 2 
Performance 
Mean 
difference 
t-Test p Value 
 
Median 
difference 
Wilcoxon p 
Value 
ROA -18.32 0.026 -0.75 0.1382 
Asset Turnover -0.06 0.451 -0.04 0.0747 
Return On Cap -5.28 0.000 -3.58 0.0000 
Return Com Eqy -6.74 0.000 -4.60 0.0000 
Leverage 
    
Tot Debt To Tot 
Asset 
2.18 0.046 2.14 0.1919 
Fncl Lvrg -2.62 0.375 0.18 0.3739 
Tot Debt To Tot Eqy 65.54 0.007 5.45 0.0561 
Tot Debt To Tot Cap 5.39 0.004 2.59 0.0402 
Investment ratios 
    
Book Val Per Share 6.26 0.279 0.51 0.0024 
Tot Capital 948.26 0.000 62.32 0.0001 
Tot Debt 737.22 0.000 25.72 0.0002 
PE Ratio -14.48 0.170 -4.32 0.0032 
 
 
Regarding the full sample, we find that profitability during the first period 
of study (Panel A) presents insignificant changes. Particularly, mean (median) 
return on assets indicates a minor reduction of -0.01 (-0.49). Both changes are 
statistically insignificant. Asset turnover flaunts a statistically significant decrease 
(-0.08) at the 1% level. The median also reports a decline, statistically 
insignificant though. 
Looking at the leverage ratios, it seen that the total debt to total assets ratio 
show a statistically significant decrease of -15%.The median falls by -20%, 
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statistically significant at the 1% level. Financial leverage, on the other hand, 
exhibits a mean and median decrease of -6% and -5%, respectively. Total debt to 
total equity experience a raw mean difference of -8.30 and the median presents a 
decline of -21.57, significant at 10% level. 
As regards to investment ratios, there is an indication of positive and 
significant during the examined period interval. Two striking examples are the 
book value per share and the total capital. For the first one, the mean and the 
median rise significantly by 26% and 32%, respectively (significant at the 1% 
level). For the second, the mean displays a rise of 35%, statistically significant at 
the 1% level and the median presents a positive movement of 40%, statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
Over the years t=-1 to t=+1 (Panel B), profitability exhibits a statistically 
significant reduction. There is a downturn trend on the whole, with some variables 
being very low. The mean in asset turnover declines by -0.07 statistically 
significant at 1% level. Similarly, the median displays a drop of -0.04, statistically 
significant at 10% level.  
 The results for leverage are puzzling since both increases and decreases 
occur, statistically insignificant though. For instance, total debt to total equity 
increases significantly by 17% concerning the mean (significant at 5% level). The 
median however, reports a minor drop of -0.04(raw difference), statistically 
insignificant though.  
During the same period, investment ratios document a discernible increase 
in three out of four ratios.  
Finally, two years after the seasoned equity offering, as it is depicted in 
Panel C, we observe that profitability tends to decline with the majority of 
changes being statistically significant. Some results seem to be also mystifying. In 
specific, means provide similar inferences as medians, meaning that both the 
mean and the median of the asset turnover, for example, appear to fall, however, 
in first case insignificantly and in the second significantly. Similar to the previous 
ratio, return on common equity has a drop of -6.74 for the mean and a drop of -
4.60 for the median (significant at the 1% level). 
 Leverage presents doubtful results as well, since most ratios are marginally 
statistically significant. Total debt to total assets, realizes a mean ascend by 8% 
(significant at the 5% level) while the median by 7%.  Regarding the total debt to 
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total equity we observe a positive and statistically significant change of 59 %( 
significant at the 1% level) while the median shows a positive and statistically 
significant change of 7% (significant at the 10% level). 
 Finally, investment ratios display, on average, a statistically significant 
increase. We should mention that for the mean book value per share, total capital 
and total debt, there are discernible increases of 226%, 109% and 120%, 
respectively. 
 
6.2.4. Analysis of Results 
Overall, we can state that profitability decreases after the SEO issuance, 
leverage shows a fluctuating performance and investment increases. To be more 
precise, for the first interval (-1, 0) which is one year before the issue, we observe 
that profitability ratios increase or decrease, but insignificantly.  However, the 
first year after the SEO the performance is negative and yet in high percentages. 
The second year after the SEO issuance, profitability continues to follow this 
monotonous negative pattern as previously. Our results are consistent with the 
findings of Hansen and Crutchley (1990) that find a statistically significant post-
issue decline in return on assets for their sample of 109 issuing firms during 1975-
1982. Confounding effects and earnings management are not the only possible 
reasons for the poor post-issue performance. As emphasized by Jung, et al. 
(1996), the cash inflow and the reduced managerial percentage ownership 
associated with an equity issue may intensify agency problems and result in lower 
operating margins. Additionally, McLaughlin, et al. (1996) provide evidence that 
the SEO firms experience a sharp, statistically significant decrease in profitability 
following the SEO in both industry-adjusted and unadjusted comparisons. 
Leverage seems to be positively affected after the SEO for financial firms, 
non financial firms and for full sample. While for the year -1 insignificant 
modulating is observed, for the years that follow there is a significant increase in 
leverage, mainly for financial firms and for whole sample. Low leverage occurs 
when the cost of borrowing money is bigger than the return a party makes on an 
equity investment. On the other hand, positive leverage depicts the condition in 
which borrowing helps enhance the return of investment compared to the return 
that would be achieved if the investor did not use any borrowed funds. In 
particular, the increase of total debt to total equity ratio, means in the main that a 
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company has been aggressive in financing its growth with debt. In addition, the 
high total debt to total capital ratio show fragile financial strength because the cost 
of these debts may reflect on the company and amplify its default risk. Obviously, 
the results are contrasting to those that shareholders wish for. 
Finally, investments increase significantly prior and after the rights issue. 
Investors tend to assess the investment value of shares by looking the PE ratio, 
book value per share and the level of total debt and total capital. In view of the 
fact that the overall results of investment ratios show an upward trend, it is crystal 
clear that shareholders are satisfied and willing to invest in the company. 
However, PE ratio presents an irregularity with significant modulating both 
negative and positive. This is not an objective depiction while there was a lack in 
data. Notwithstanding this lack we should mention the importance of the ratio. In 
general, a high PE suggests that investors are expecting higher earnings growth in 
the future compared to companies with a lower PE. Conversely, a low PE ratio 
does not necessarily denote that a company is undervalued; rather it could indicate 
that the market believes the company is headed for problems in the near future.  
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
7. Conclusion 
This master thesis questions how a SEO affects the short and long run 
performance of a firm around the ex-rights date. Our work is motivated by the 
contradictory findings of prior literature which documents positive, negative or 
zero abnormal stock returns following a SEO and by the scarcity of relevant 
studies in the Greek stock market.  
The Greek stock market presents a number of significant idiosyncrasies 
relating to equity issuance. There are two ways of raising capital: the nominal 
increase of capital and the actual increase of capital. Each way has its pros and 
cons and is affected by different regulatory procedures. In this study we analyse 
310 SEOs launched by a number of financial and non-financial firms listed on the 
ASE  during 1999-2006. 
Our research is two-fold. First, it provides empirical evidence on the 
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reaction of common stock prices around ex-rights days. We compute the abnormal 
returns of common stocks prices by applying the event study methodology. For 
the whole sample, in line with Goyal et al. (1994) who claimed that the behaviour 
of stock price presents a significant abnormal stock return on the ex-day, rights 
issues in Greece are associated with positive abnormal stock returns. As regards to 
the sub- samples, the results are mixed. The abnormal returns for financial firms 
are also positive, whereas for non financial firms are negative.  
The overall findings are important to be taken into consideration during 
investment decisions in a growing capital market, while similar phenomena may 
be apparent in the stock exchanges of other developing countries. We also find 
that the market reaction prior and post the ex-date do not present any statistical 
significance. This result means that the Greek stock market is efficient in 
absorbing new corporate information. Moreover, during the examined period the 
ASE has undergone significant changes that strengthened the regulatory 
framework and thus enhancing efficiency. However, there is a difficulty in 
comparing our results with previous studies since most of them are focused on the 
stock price reaction surrounding the announcement date. 
The second objective of our study deals with the long-term performance of 
firms carrying out a SEO. For this purpose, we analyzed profitability ratios, 
leverage and investment ratios for different intervals before and after the ex-rights 
date of SEO. By performing mean and median test we reported a diminishing 
behavior in profitability after the SEO issuance, a fluctuating performance in 
leverage and an increase in investment for the whole sample and for the sub-
sample of non-financial firms. The results from the profitability are in line with 
those of Hansen and Crutchley (1990) who found a statistically significant post-
issue decline in return on assets and McLaughlin, et al. (1996) who documented a 
sharp and statistically significant decrease in profitability following the SEO.  
The results from leverage ratios should be taken cautiously since no 
direction is safely identified. Low leverage means that the cost of borrowing 
money is higher than the return a party makes on an equity investment and high 
leverage explains the condition in which borrowing helps enhancing the return of 
an investment.  
Furthermore, the increase in investment ratios is very affirmative for the 
performance of the companies in the view of growth and very promising for 
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investors. In sum, the interpretation of ratios is quite puzzling.  
Ratios are important to help determine a company‟s financial health, but 
when few of them are used, the conclusion that can be derived, might be unsecure. 
Future research avenues should be directed to the deeper long-term analysis 
surrounding SEOs. The issuance of SEO engenders changes in various sectors, 
like the structure of the board, area which certainly necessitates further 
investigation. 
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